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ISSUES
In recent Senate testimony, FBI Director William
Webster noted that organized crime's "interest in labor
unions will coincide with their interest in cash-intensive
organizations, or with organizations that can influence
or intimidate employers that they are trying to take
advantage of." With this admonition in mind, the state
of New Jersey has attempted to prevent infiltration by
organized crime of its fledgling casino gambling indus-
try by regulating labor unions representing casino em-
ployees. The method chosen to accomplish this
objective, however, collides with federally granted and
protected rights given to employees to choose their col-
lective bargaining representative. The Court is being
asked to decide which interest prevails.
FACTS
In 1976, the voters of New Jersey amended their
state constitution to permit casino gambling in Atlantic
City. Recognizing the susceptibility of the gambling in-
dustry to infiltration and control by organized crime,
and desiring to maintain the public confidence in, and
integrity of, the industry, the New Jersey legislature
passed the Casino Control Act (CCA). Enforcement of
the CCA was vested in two state agencies: the Division of
Gaming Enforcement (division) and the Casino Control
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Commission (commission).
The CCA is a detailed and comprehensive licensing
scheme designed to strictly regulate all persons, loca-
tions, practices and associations related to the operation
of casinos and related service industries. As part of this
overall regulatory scheme, section 93 of the CCA re-
quires all unions which represent casino hotel employees
to register with the commission. Section 93 also provides
that no registered union may collect dues from casino
employees or administer employee benefit plans if any
officer of the union is found by the commission to be
disqualified from being involved in the casino industry.
The Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartend-
ers International Union Local 54 (Local 54) represents,
for purposes of collective bargaining with employers,
hotel and restaurant service employees who work in
certain southern New Jersey counties, including Atlantic
City. Of the approximately 12,000 employees repre-
sented by Local 54, over 8,000 are employed in casino
hotels in Atlantic City as waiters, bartenders, cooks and
housekeepers. The sole income received by Local 54 is
derived from dues and initiation fees-85% of which
come from casino hotel employees. These monies are
expended for expenses and salaries related to the nego-
tiation and administration of collective bargaining
agreements and other activities related to representing
the employees.
Pursuant to section 93 of the CCA, Local 54 and its
officers registered with the commission. Thereafter, the
division conducted an investigation and reported to the
commission that certain officials of Local 54 were dis-
qualified. A hearing was scheduled by the commission to
consider these allegations.
Local 54 filed a complaint in federal district court
contending that section 93 of the CCA was preempted
by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which
grants employees the right to choose unions to represent
them, and the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA), which regulates employee benefit plans.
Local 54 asked the court to enjoin the commission from
holding the hearing. The district court denied the re-
quest for an injunction. This decision was appealed to
the federal court of appeals.
In the interim, the commission held its disqualifica-
tion hearing. The commission found that Frank Gerace,
president of Local 54, and Frank Materio, a member of
Local 54's executive board, have an association with
Nicodemo Scarfo, whom the commission identified as a
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career criminal offender and member of organized
crime. This association was found to create a reasonable
belief that its existence was inimical to the policies of the
CCA and the casino industry, although there was no
evidence of wrongdoing by the officers or criminal in-
fluence on the union. The commission also found that
Karlos LaSane, an agent of Local 54 who handles dis-
crimination complaints and grievances for casino em-
ployees, had been convicted in 1973 of extortion while
he was a City Commissioner of Atlantic City. Based on
these findings, the commission held that Gerace,
Materio and LaSane were disqualified, and ordered that
they be removed as officers and agents of Local 54. In
the event they were not removed, the commission or-
dered that Local 54 be banned from collecting dues
from casino employees.
The district court enjoined enforcement of this ban
pending the outcome of the appeal to the court of ap-
peals. That court held that the disqualification standards
for union representatives, and the dues collection ban,
were preempted by the NLRA and that the prohibition
on administration of benefit plans contained in section
93 was preempted by ERISA. Accordingly, the court
remanded the case to the district court for entry of an
order enjoining the commission and division from tak-
ing any further action to enforce section 93 of the CCA.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
The NLRA is a federal statute which guarantees
employees the right to organize and to choose a labor
union to represent them in collective bargaining with
employers. Section 93 of the CCA interferes with that
right by prohibiting unions, whose leaders the commis-
sion finds disqualified, from collective dues-thereby
restricting the unions' ability to effectively carry out
their collective bargaining functions. The Supreme
Court is faced with the task of further clarifying the
extent to which Congress intended to oust the states
from regulating labor union activities.
The state of New Jersey claims a deeply rooted state
interest in preventing the corruption of its casino indus-
try. This goal cannot be achieved merely through direct
regulation of the industry, but must include regulation
of labor unions, because such organizations provide a
vehicle for organized crime to influence and intimidate
the industry through labor racketeering. Local 54, how-
ever, asserts that federal labor law grants employees the
right to be represented by unions of their own choosing.
If the union is prohibited from collecting casino employ-
ees' dues, it will have insufficient resources and be un-
able to function as a collective bargaining representative.
Thus, section 93 acts to interfere with the employees'
choice of bargaining agent.
Two previous cases dealing with state attempts to
impose "licensing" requirements on labor unions have
been decided by the Supreme Court with opposite re-
sults. In 1943, Florida passed a law requiring licensing
for union business agents and setting certain qualifica-
tions standards which had to be met to receive a license.
Pursuant to the statute, the state court enjoined a union
from engaging in collective bargaining activities until
the license was obtained. The Supreme Court struck
down the Florida statute because it directly interfered
with the right given to employees by federal law to
choose their own union. By requiring a union to satisfy
prerequisites which the state considered important for a
bargaining agent, the state limited the freedom of the
employees to make that decision for themselves. (Hill v.
Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945)).
The second case involved the New York Waterfront
Commission Act of 1953. This statute was adopted pur-
suant to an interstate compact between New York and
New Jersey designed to combat crime and corruption on
the waterfront. The compact was approved by Congress.
The Waterfront Commission Act prohibited unions re-
presenting waterfront employees from collecting dues if
any union officer were a convicted felon. The Supreme
Court upheld the Act against a challenge that it inter-
fered with employees' rights under the NLRA to choose
their representatives. The Court found that the act did
not totally restrict employee rights, and in light of the
purpose, scope and background of the law, as well as
Congress' relation to it, there was no basis to find a
conflict with federal labor law. (DeVeau v. Braisted, 363
U.S. 144 (1960)).
The decision of the Supreme Court in this case will
have immediate significance only for the state of New
Jersey and Nevada, the only states with legalized casino
gambling, and those few labor unions representing ca-
sino employees. (Although the same state interests in
controlling gambling occur in the horse racing industry,
the federal-state conflict does not arise because the fed-
eral labor laws have not been applied to that industry.) If
the Court upholds the validity of the CCA as it applies to
labor unions, it will afford the state a significant weapon
for combatting organized crime and maintaining the
integrity of the casino gambling industry. This goal will
be achieved, however, at the sacrifice of the rights and
interests of union members. The members of Local 54
voted in secret ballot election to select the officers of
their union. The 12,000 employees whom Local 54
represents freely designated that union to represent
them in collective bargaining. Both the election of offi-
cers and selection of bargaining representative were
accomplished in accordance with federal guidelines es-
tablished to regulate labor activities. To allow the state to
disapprove of the employees' choice as to either of these
two issues undermines the strength and independence
of the union as an institution-thereby undercutting its
effectiveness in representing employees.
The long range significance of this case depends on
the Court's formulation and implementation of the
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preemption doctrine. In clarifying this principle, the
boundaries of state regulatory activities in the labor field
could be broadened or narrowed. The result will influ-
ence state decisions regarding contemplated legislation
which either directly or indirectly impacts on labor
union activities.
ARGUMENTS
For the Department of Law and Public Safety, Division of
Gaming Enforcement, State of New Jersey
1. Federal labor law does not preempt enforcement by
the state of New Jersey of the Casino Control Act as it
applies to labor unions. Federal labor policy permits
state regulation involving deeply rooted state inter-
ests. The means chosen by the state to enforce its
regulation-a ban on dues collection--does not di-
rectly interfere with the performance of the union's
functions under federal labor law so as to require
preemption. The outcome of this case is directly con-
trolled by DeVeau v. Braisted.
2. ERISA does not preempt section 93 of the CCA.
Section 93 does not attempt to regulate the terms of
employee benefit plans but only affects employee
benefit plans indirectly.
For the Casino Control Commission, State of New Jersey
1. The abstention principles enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Younger v. Harris (401 U.S. 37 (1971)) pro-
hibited the federal court from staying the enforce-
ment of the commission's order. The notion of
comity, based on the recognition that our federal
system of government will function best when the
states and their institutions are allowed to perform
their separate functions in their separate ways, gener-
ally requires federal courts to refrain from interfer-
ing with pending state judicial proceedings except in
unusual circumstances. The union has an adequate
state forum in which to raise its challenge to the
constitutionality of the CCA; it can appeal the com-
mission's decision and order to the state appellate
courts. The state courts are fully competent to ad-
dress the constitutional issue raised and should be
afforded the opportunity to do so.
2. The Supreme Court need not decide whether ERISA
preempts the CCA remedy relating to pension and
welfare fund administration because this remedy was
not invoked by the commission in this case.
For Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union, Local 54
1. This case is not an appropriate one for the applica-
tion of the Younger abstention doctrine. The Depart-
ment of Law and Public Safety did not invoke the
abstention doctrine but rather seeks an adjudication
on the merits by the Supreme Court. Where the
department, on behalf of the state, voluntarily sub-
mits the dispute to a federal court, principles of com-
ity are not applicable and abstention by the federal
court is not required. Neither is abstention required
where a party is challenging the validity of the state
proceeding itself. Local 54 asserts that the commis-
sion's authority to conduct the disqualification hear-
ing was preempted by federal labor law and therefore
the entire proceeding was invalid. Requiring Local 54
to challenge the commission's proceedings and order
through the state courts provides an inadequate rem-
edy for the irreparable harm which would be suf-
fered by Local 54 pending state court review.
2. Section 93 of the CCA is preempted by the NLRA.
When a state attempts to regulate activity directly
protected by federal labor law, the state regulation is
absolutely preempted. In such a situation it is un-
necessary to balance the federal and state interests
involved; the balance was already struck by Congress
in enacting the federal law. The outcome of this case
is directly controlled by Hill v. Florida.
3. Section 514(a) of ERISA provides that ERISA super-
sedes all state laws relating to employee benefit plans.
Section 93 of the CCA relates to employee benefit
plans in a direct manner by disqualifying certain per-
sons from serving as plan administrators, an issue
which ERISA itself covers.
AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of Local 54
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America.
In Support of Department of Law and Public Safety and
Casino Control Commission
Atlantic City Casino Hotel Association and Playboy
Hotel Casino; state of Nevada; and National Right to
Work Legal Defense Foundation.
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